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Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war
Tadeusz Iwański
Ukraine’s financial results over the past few months prove that the economic crisis which has 
been ongoing since mid 2012 has exacerbated. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry 
of Economy, Gross Domestic Product for the first six months of 2014 shrank by 3%. In the se-
cond quarter, it fell by 4.6%1 and may further be reduced by as much as 8–10% over the year 
as a whole. After the first six months of this year, the balance of payments deficit reached 
US$4.3 billion. After deflation last year, prices grew by 12%, and the hryvnia dropped to 
a historic low. Although a surplus was seen in Ukrainian foreign trade in goods and services, 
reaching over US$3 billion at the end of June, its trade volume is shrinking. The main reason 
behind this deteriorating situation is the actions taken by Russia. Moscow has been fomenting 
the conflict in Donbas since April, has consistently imposed embargoes on imports of more and 
more Ukrainian goods and cut gas supplies to Ukraine in June. This has forced the government 
to focus on the current management of state finances and to carry out budget sequestration 
twice this year. The government has also used this as an excuse not to implement necessary sys-
temic reforms. The increasing share of military expenditure, the shrinking exports (-5% in the 
first six months), including in particular to Russia, which until recently was Ukraine’s key trade 
partner, and the rapid fall in industrial production and investments have all made the situation 
even worse. All that saves Ukraine from an economic collapse is the loan from the International 
Monetary Fund and higher taxes, which allows the government to maintain budget liquidity. 
However, if the conflict in Donbas lasts longer and if Russia continues its economic blackmail, 
including withholding gas supplies, the economic crisis may prove to be long-lasting. 
Donbas: industry under fire1
Factories and infrastructure in Donetsk and Lu-
hansk Oblasts have sustained direct losses as 
a consequence of military actions. These losses, 
in tandem with the significant fall in the output 
of companies operating in the region, are among 
the main reasons why the Ukrainian economy is 
shrinking. Donbas, Ukraine’s most industrialised 
1 All data, unless another source is indicated in the text, 
originate from the National Statistical Service of Ukraine 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua Data concerning Donbas should be 
seen as estimates due to the war in the region. 
region, had a 16% share of the country’s GDP in 
2013 and generated around 25% of its exports2. 
Between January and August 2014, produc-
tion fell in all sectors in the region. The indus-
tries which have suffered the greatest losses in 
Donetsk oblast3 are: light industry (-50%), the 
chemical industry (-45%), the machine-building 
2 Самаєва Юл., ‘Донбас приречений?’, Дзеркало тижня. 
Україна №32, http://gazeta.dt.ua/macrolevel/don-
bas-prirecheniy-_.html 
3 No detailed data is available for Luhansk Oblast. The Lu-
hansk branch of Ukrstat stopped publishing statistical 
information in mid July. However, it should be assumed 
that the economic situation in this oblast is worse than 
in Donetsk Oblast. 
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industry (-37%) and the metallurgical industry 
(-19%). As compared to the same period last 
year, industrial production in Donetsk and Lu-
hansk Oblasts has fallen by 20% and 33% re-
spectively (by 58.7% and 85% respectively in 
August 2014 as compared to August 2013), 
which resulted in a total reduction of Ukraine’s 
industrial production over this period by 7.8%. 
The downward trend had been evident for sev-
eral months, but it exacerbated rapidly in July. 
Larger industrial plants in Donbas suspended 
operation in August, including the Avdiivka coke 
plant, one of the largest coke producers in Eu-
rope (as a consequence of artillery fire), which 
accounts for one third of Ukraine’s coke output. 
As a result, the metallurgical sector has been 
paralysed, since coke is a key raw material in this 
sector. The Donetsk and Makiivka metallurgical 
plants also suspended production. The plant in 
Yenakiieve is only partly operational. Volodymyr 
Hroisman, the first deputy prime minister, an-
nounced in September that the output of the 
metallurgical industry, whose products account 
for 25% of Ukrainian exports, had fallen by 55% 
in Donbas, and the chemical plants in the region 
were to stop production altogether. Accord-
ing to Serhiy Taruta, the governor of Donetsk 
Oblast, only two large metallurgical plants cur-
rently operate in the region. These are Azovstal 
and Ilyich Iron and Steel Works, both located 
in Mariupol, a city controlled by the Ukrainian 
forces. The other factories from this sector have 
suspended production. 
Similar problems have been seen in the mining 
industry. According to governmental estimates, 
70% of mines have suspended operation in the 
territories controlled by the separatists in Do-
netsk Oblast due to power supply interruptions 
and damage to power stations. Without power 
supplies, miners are unable to pump out water 
and methane from the shafts. This has forced 
mines to stop production. The remaining mines 
halted work due to destruction of railroads 
which had been used to transport their pro-
duction and also due to the lack of explosives, 
which are produced by plants that are under 
the control of the separatists. Coal production 
in the entire Donetsk Oblast fell by almost 14% 
in the first eight months of this year. As a re-
sult, exports of goods from Donbas in this pe-
riod, shrank by almost 20%. This includes an 
over 50% fall in exports to Russia, which tradi-
tionally was the region’s largest trade partner. 
According to data from the National Fiscal Ser-
vice, the state budget sustained losses worth 
around US$350 million in the first six months of 
this year due to incomplete tax collection from 
this region. 
In addition to direct destruction of industri-
al facilities, clashes in Donbas result in regular 
damage to infrastructure, including roads and 
railroads, which is essential for the operation of 
industry, distribution and sales. This damage is 
also impeding production in other regions of 
the country since supplies of raw materials to 
plants located outside Donbas have been either 
disrupted or withheld. The transport paralysis 
will also adversely affect the financial results of 
the national railways, for which freight trans-
port is a major source of income. At present, 
the Ukrainian railways’ losses are estimated to 
have reached around US$80 million4. Another 
problem for the industry of Donbas is the rising 
prices of raw materials and by-products needed 
for production. There are also problems with lo-
gistics, affecting production storage and trans-
port, for example, and the availability of fuel. 
The agricultural sector has also found itself in 
trouble in the area covered by the anti-separatist 
4 Кірєєв А., ‘Який збиток війна завдала “Укрзалізниці”’, 
Економічна Правда, 15 September 2014, http://www.
epravda.com.ua/columns/2014/09/15/491070/ 
Production levels fell in all sectors of Don-
bas in the first six months of this year. The 
clashes have also resulted in damages to 
infrastructure and logistical problems.
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peration. Landmines have been planted in 
some fields, and special permits, from both the 
armed forces of Ukraine and the separatists, are 
often required to cultivate other fields. Further-
more, the sector is short of fertilisers and work-
force, since some men have been conscripted 
and others have left Donbas. While the owners 
of large plants have been unable to move their 
businesses elsewhere, small and medium-sized 
business owners have been moving their pro-
duction and services outside the region. Ac-
cording to data from the Council of Entrepre-
neurs of Donetsk Oblast, around 80% of such 
firms have left the oblast. 
The total losses sustained by the region and 
their impact on the state budget are still diffi-
cult to estimate precisely5. This is due to both 
the lack of reliable data on the scale of damage 
and the fact that Donbas for political reasons 
used to be the most heavily subsidised region 
under Viktor Yanukovych’s rule. In the opinion 
of deputy prime minister Volodymyr Hroisman, 
Ukraine has sustained a total loss of 12 billion 
hryvnias (almost US$1 billion) as a result of the 
conflict in its eastern regions. Prime Minister 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s previous estimates of the 
funds necessary to rebuild Donbas were eight 
times higher. The conference of donors for the 
reconstruction of Donbas, planned to be held 
by the end of October, will certainly be unable 
to collect such a sum (although a number of 
states have offered financial aid to the region, 
5 According to estimates from the  United Nations Of-
fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs as of 
mid September 2014, the losses had reached US$440 
million. However, in this case the losses were seriously 
underrated, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/Sitrep%2012_Ukraine.pdf  
Germany is the only country to have declared 
the precise sum: 0.5 billion euros), and the 
Ukrainian budget is too small to cope with such 
expenses. Maintaining the ceasefire is essential 
for the reconstruction of infrastructure – roads, 
bridges and railroads before the winter season 
begins. This will allow streamlining of logistics: 
raw material and by-product supplies to local 
industry and production exports, as well as coal 
supplies to power plants to enable resumption 
of power supplies to industrial plants. The gov-
ernment in Kyiv is convinced that part of this 
work has already begun. However, since the 
government does not have full control of the 
region and, more importantly, the region’s sta-
tus is unclear, it is debatable whether such re-
construction makes sense. In effect, the return 
to status quo ante bellum will take a long time, 
if it is possible at all.
The Ukrainian economy in figures
The current macroeconomic data prove that 
the crisis in Ukraine is worsening. The country’s 
economy had already been slowing down from 
mid 2012, after three years of economic growth. 
However, in the middle of the current year, the 
basic economic indicators began falling precipi-
tously. While GDP fell by 1.1% in the first three 
months of this year, Ukraine’s economy in the 
second quarter shrank by as much as 4.6%. Al-
though no data concerning the GDP decline in 
both oblasts of Donbas is available, it can be as-
sumed that this ratio would have been negative 
for the entire Ukraine even had there been no 
conflict in the region. This is because the military 
conflict and the Russian embargo on imports 
of many Ukrainian goods are an addition to the 
economic consequences of former president 
Viktor Yanukovych’s administration (2010–2014), 
which was characterised by overexploitation and 
unwillingness to carry out reforms, resulting in 
zero GDP growth at the end of 2013. 
After the first eight months of this year, the 
greatest losses in industrial production on 
a nationwide scale were seen in the machine- 
The overall losses sustained by Donbas are 
difficult to estimate. It will take the region 
a long time to return to the state it was in 
before the war, if it is possible at all.
4OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 148
-building sector (-20.3%), the chemical sector 
(-15.7%) and the metallurgical sector (-11.9%), 
whose production is of key significance for 
Ukrainian exports. As the country’s economy is 
weakening, its people become impoverished, 
and domestic demand is falling. Between Janu-
ary and August, the inflation rate rose to 12.9% 
(and is expected to reach 19% by the end of 
this year). As a result, the level of real wages 
dropped by almost 9%. 
The existing dire situation in public finances is 
additionally aggravated by the growing national 
debt and state-guaranteed debt. As of the end of 
July 2014, the national debt exceeded US$69 bil-
lion (including foreign debt of US$30 billion); an 
increase of US$4 billion from the end of March. 
The good news is that Ukraine will not have to 
incur significant debt service costs in the imme-
diate future: in 2015, it will have to pay around 
US$3 billion, mainly as repayment of its previous 
loan from the IMF. It is estimated that, given the 
new loans granted by the West and the fact that 
the deficit generated by Naftogaz of Ukraine has 
increased by almost US$5 billion this year, the 
national debt will exceed 60% of GDP at the end 
of 2014 (at the end of June it stood at 57% of 
GDP). External funding to a great extent enables 
the state to cope with the growing military ex-
penditure and to keep a tight rein on the budget 
deficit. Towards the end of the year, it stood at 
6.3% of GDP; the difference from the rate in the 
same period last year being insignificant6. Ac-
cording to some Ukrainian economists, these in-
dicators prove that the risk of bankruptcy is low 
6 See, for example, Case-Ukraine report, Бюджетний 
літопис: 2 квартал 2014 року, http://www.case-ukraine.
com.ua/sites/default/files/budget_report01092014.pdf 
for Ukraine for this year and the next. In con-
trast, some Western observers do see this risk7. 
Another problem is posed by Ukraine’s constant-
ly depleting currency reserves, which shrank by 
21.3% from the beginning of this year and stood 
at US$15.8 billion on 1 September, and the ever 
weaker Ukrainian currency. The official exchange 
rate of the hryvnia dropped to a historic low on 
27 August, i.e. UAH13.89 to US$1. This meant 
that it had weakened by almost 74% from the 
beginning of the year. Further devaluation of the 
hryvnia is likely and will depend on the way the 
situation in Donbas develops and on stabilising 
moves to be made by the central bank.
Foreign trade:  
EU preferences and Russian restrictions
Ukraine generated a surplus in foreign trade 
in goods and services in the first six months of 
this year, reaching over US$3 billion. This was 
almost twice as much as at the end of the first 
quarter (+US$1.7 billion). However, the surplus 
seen since the beginning of the year goes in 
tandem with Ukraine’s falling trade volume, 
and results from the hryvnia’s depreciation and 
the fact that imports are falling at a more rap-
id rate than exports due to lower domestic de-
mand. Between January and July this year, the 
value of Ukrainian imports fell by 20.5% and ex-
ports by 5.3% year on year. The decrease in ex-
ports in the first seven months of this year was 
mainly an effect of falling sales of railway and 
tram carriages by over US$800 million (main-
ly to Russia), fertilisers by over US$400 million 
and agricultural products by over US$300 mil-
lion. What gave a boost to Ukrainian exports 
within the same period was increasing sales 
of grain and oils resulting from a record-high 
harvest last year. Grain exports, in particular 
wheat to North African states, more than dou-
7 Wigglesworth R., Olearchyk R., ‘Ukraine’s economy: 
Broken down’, Financial Times, 20 August 2014, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/63e0a202-26fb-11e4-a46a-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3AwS63sSm 
The national debt and inflation rate are 
rising ever higher, levels of currency re-
serves and real wages are falling, and the 
hryvnia has dropped to a historic low.
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bled within this timeframe. These indicators 
prove that the structure of Ukrainian exports 
is gradually changing. Metallurgical products 
were Ukraine’s primary export for more than 
a decade. Foreign sales of these products have 
been decreasing over recent years. At present, 
their share of Ukraine’s export income stands 
at 26%, and has fallen by 11% compared to the 
first six months of 2013. Meanwhile, production 
and export of food and agricultural products 
are growing rapidly (by almost 23% between 
January and July year on year). Their share in 
Ukraine’s total exports was equal to that of 
metallurgical products. This change mainly re-
sults from the fact that Russia used to be an 
important client of the Ukrainian metallurgical 
sector, while food and agricultural products 
can be successfully sold to the Middle Eastern, 
African and EU markets. 
The geographic structure of Ukrainian for-
eign trade is also changing. Exports of goods 
to EU countries accounted for 32.6% of total 
Ukrainian exports in the first seven months of 
this year. The zero customs rate on most goods 
exported to the EU as part of the Autonomous 
Trade Preferences regime (introduced in April 
2014 and extended to the end of 2015) has con-
tributed to increasing exports of those goods 
which had previously been sold to the Russian 
market (products of the metallurgical, chemi-
cal, machine-building and food and agriculture 
sectors). Although imports from the EU de-
creased by 18% in the first six months, the value 
of exports to the EU increased by almost 15%; 
the greatest individual recipient of Ukrainian 
exports among EU countries being Poland, with 
a share of 5.3% (an increase of 24% in compar-
ison with the first half of 2013). 
Russia still represents the greatest share of 
Ukrainian imports, accounting for almost 28% 
of all goods brought into Ukraine in the first 
seven months of this year, and the greatest 
foreign buyer of Ukrainian goods (a share of 
20%). However, trade value has rapidly de-
creased in both of these areas: exports have 
fallen by 23.7%, and imports by 20.7%. At the 
same time, in July alone (as compared to July 
2013), imports from Russia shrank by 53.7% as 
a consequence of the cuts in Russian gas sup-
plies. As a result, Ukraine had an unprecedent-
ed surplus in bilateral trade of US$140 million 
(between January and July, the balance was 
negative, standing at minus US$2.3 billion). 
The trade volume is shrinking due to tense re-
lations between Kyiv and Moscow, one effect 
of which is the trade restrictions which Russia 
regularly imposes on Ukraine. The value of im-
ports from Russia fell mainly due to lower gas 
prices between January and March and due to 
Gazprom’s cutting of gas supplies to Ukraine in 
mid June. Another reason is that the boycotting 
of Russian goods has become a popular form 
of protest in most regions of Ukraine. In turn, 
problems with exports are caused primarily 
by cancellations of orders by Russian custom-
ers, falling industrial production in Ukraine as 
a consequence of the anti-separatist operation 
and the embargo imposed by Russia on imports 
of Ukrainian goods (including processed vege-
tables, fruit and fish, some kinds of cheese and 
dairy products, and some products of plant or-
igin). According to the Ukrainian government’s 
estimates, trade volume with Russia will fall by 
35%, while total Ukrainian exports will decrease 
by 11.6%, and imports by 21.1% by the end of 
the year. This will mean further reorientation 
of Ukrainian foreign trade from Russia to the 
EU (and North Africa in the case of agricultural 
products). However, Russia is the main supplier 
of oil and gas to Ukraine and, without diversify-
ing the sources of these materials, eliminating 
Ukraine’s heavy dependence on these would be 
extremely onerous in economic terms.
Ukraine sells more and more to the EU and 
less and less to Russia, but its total foreign 
trade volume is constantly shrinking. 
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Actions taken by the government 
and Western aid
The situation in Donbas has forced the govern-
ment to manage the state budget on a day-to-
day basis and to search for new funds. Sourc-
es of additional budgetary income will include 
above all new taxes, cuts in investment and 
welfare programmes and the receipt of foreign 
loans and financial aid. However, the govern-
ment has failed to initiate system-wide reforms. 
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk announced on 
10 September that it was necessary to postpone 
the most important economic reforms due to 
the conflict in Donbas, significant outflow of 
investment and an absence of new investment. 
Furthermore, the government has in fact put the 
privatisation process on hold. According to data 
from the State Property Fund of Ukraine, income 
from privatisation in the first half of 2014 only 
amounted to US$4 million, while the planned 
amount was almost US$1.5 billion. 
The challenge the government constantly needs 
to face is finding money for the continuation of 
the anti-separatist operation, which costs over 
US$5 million daily. Furthermore, budget reve-
nues from income tax and VAT have been falling 
due to the situation in the east of the country (in 
2012, Donbas accounted for around 12% of tax 
revenues). Currency depreciation, withholding 
the payment of VAT rebates to exporters and 
an additional monetary issue of hryvnia have 
been able to compensate for this only partly. 
As a result, budget expenditure in the second 
quarter was 4.4% higher than a year before8. To 
find sufficient funds for the army and to main-
tain fiscal discipline as required by Western 
creditors, the government imposed new taxes 
on individuals and business entities (including, 
for example, a military tax at 1.5% of income, 
a tax on deposits, higher excise duty rates and 
a tax on the production of mineral resources) 
and made further cuts in welfare spending and 
sectoral subsidies. In effect, army funding has 
8 Case Ukraine report, op.cit
nearly doubled (according to some economists, 
to a record-high level of 2% of GDP) and bud-
get incomes have become more realistic. 
The amendments have also made it possible for 
funds obtained as part of foreign aid to be tak-
en into account in the state budget. It would 
probably have been impossible to maintain the 
feeble liquidity in public finances without this 
aid. The most important portion of it is the 
IMF loan worth almost US$17 billion granted 
to Ukraine on 30 April for two years. As part 
of this loan, two instalments worth in total 
US$4.5 billion have already been made available 
to Ukraine. Furthermore, it has been promised 
that the third and the fourth instalments will 
be combined and made available by the end of 
this year. This loan is a key source of Ukraine’s 
financial stability. Furthermore, its structure is 
flexible, and therefore it can be used to finance 
the current budget deficit9. In September, Kyiv 
also received US$500 million from the World 
Bank and a promise to be granted another in-
stalment of equal value in the first quarter of 
next year. In addition to these funds, which are 
allocated partly to improve budget liquidity, 
Ukraine has received a number of smaller loans 
(for example, US$100 million from Japan) and 
special purpose grants for the implementation 
of reforms or reconstruction of specific infra-
structure or industry facilities. 
Possible scenarios
The condition of the Ukrainian economy will 
depend on the way relations with Russia, in-
cluding the conflict in Donbas, will develop. 
9 Arkadiusz Sarna, ‘Ukraine to receive an IMF rescue loan’, 
8 May 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2014-05-08/ukraine-to-receive-imf-rescue-loan
Foreign financial aid and tax raises, rather 
than system reforms, are the key means 
to balance the current budget.
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If Moscow maintains restrictions on exports 
from Ukraine or imposes new ones, the eco-
nomic crisis will exacerbate. It is still unclear 
whether Russian gas supplies to Ukraine will be 
resumed. If negotiations are unsuccessful, Kyiv 
will have to enforce a radical gas saving pro-
gramme (to reduce gas consumption by 30% in 
the 2014–2015 winter heating season), which 
will adversely affect Ukrainian companies’ pro-
duction figures. If, on the other hand, the par-
ties reach a temporary compromise, the budget 
will be seriously strained due to the need to re-
pay the debt (or part of it) to Russia and to buy 
gas. The continuation of the military operation 
in Donbas will mean further degradation of lo-
cal industry, will adversely affect the country’s 
attractiveness as an investment destination and 
negatively impact the level of domestic con-
sumption and Ukraine’s creditworthiness. If the 
ceasefire in Donbas is maintained, a gradual 
reconstruction of infrastructure and bringing 
industrial plants back into operation will be-
come possible. However, the region’s future 
status as part of Ukraine is still unclear, and it 
is difficult to determine what kind of budget 
relations with Kyiv it will have, just as it is diffi-
cult to verify the financial consequences of the 
special act on Donbas passed by the Verkhovna 
Rada (Ukrainian parliament) on 16 September10. 
What is clear is that the region will need heavy 
subsidies and a lot of funds for reconstruction, 
and will need much time to return to the level 
of production it sustained before the war. The 
state will continue to allocate a great part of 
its expenses on defence. The good news is that 
grain crop yields are expected to be high, at 
around 60 million tonnes, this year. In effect, in 
the best-case scenario, the rate of GDP decline 
will subside in the final quarter of this year (as 
the situation becomes calmer in the east of the 
country and exports of agricultural products 
generate more income) and this rate of decline 
will be in single figures by the end of the year. 
However, in the most likely case, the decline will 
be more serious and the recession will continue 
in 2015. 
10 Tadeusz Iwański, ‘Ukraine’s parliament passes a spe-
cial act for Donbas’, OSW Analyses, 17 September 
2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2014-09-17/ukraines-parliament-passes-a-special-
act-donbas
